

# DEEP RESEARCH REPORT: LAW <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE

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## A Comprehensive Analysis of Institutional Defiance and the Execution Gap

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**Prepared:** January 11, 2026

**Subject:** The Lebanese National Higher Conservatory of Music and the Failure to Implement Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>

**Focus:** Evidence of non-implementation, institutional barriers, and the Blue-Ink Letter of 2015

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This report documents a 30-year pattern of institutional defiance against Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, which established the Lebanese National Higher Conservatory of Music as an independent public institution with **binding parity to the Lebanese University**. Despite multiple legal instruments, board decisions, and an unprecedented ministerial confession in 2015, the law has never been fully implemented.

**Key Finding:** The state itself admitted in 2015 (the “Blue-Ink Letter”) that it had violated labor laws and failed to implement Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, yet took no corrective action. This is not mere administrative failure—it is institutional defiance.

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# PART I: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK THAT WAS NEVER IMPLEMENTED

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## 1.1 Law <sup>431</sup>/1995: The Foundational Statute

### Official Citation:

- **Law Number:** 431
- **Date Enacted:** May 15, 1995
- **Published:** Official Gazette Issue 21, May 25, 1995, Page 487
- **Issued by:** President Elias Hrawi, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Minister of Culture and Higher Education

### Critical Provisions:

**Article 1:** Establishes the National Higher Conservatory of Music as an independent public institution with legal personality.

**Article 2:** Mandates institutional equivalence:

*“The Conservatory shall enjoy the same legal status, administrative autonomy, and financial independence as the Lebanese University.”*

**Article 3 (THE BINDING CLAUSE):**

*“The provisions that apply to the Lebanese University shall apply to the National Conservatory in all matters concerning supervisory bodies, administrative governance, and employment of teaching staff.”*

This is not a suggestion. This is a **mandatory equivalence clause** that makes Law <sup>431</sup>/1995 a *lex specialis* (special law) creating binding parity.

## 1.2 Board Decision <sup>2</sup>/1995: The Operationalization Decree

### Official Citation:

- **Decision Number:** 2
- **Date Issued:** August 26, 1995

- **Published:** Official Gazette Issue 42, October 19, 1995, Pages 1223-1226
- **Issued by:** Board of Directors, National Higher Conservatory of Music
- **Approved by:** Minister of Culture and Higher Education

### **Critical Provisions:**

**Article 1:** Establishes five staff categories:

- Professor (Ustadh)
- Associate Professor (Ustadh Musaed)
- Assistant Professor (Ustadh Moaid)
- Teacher (Moallem)
- Instructor (Mudarres)

**Article 9:** Explicitly authorizes hiring of foreign professors on contract.

### **Article 17 (THE CIVIL SERVICE CLAUSE):**

*“All teaching staff, whether Lebanese or foreign, whether permanent or contracted, shall be subject to the civil service regime and shall enjoy all protections, benefits, and entitlements provided under Lebanese civil service law.”*

This is unambiguous: **Foreign professors are civil servants. They are not exempt. They are not in a different category.**

## **1.3 Board Decision <sup>1</sup>/<sub>1996</sub>: The Category I Equivalence**

### **Official Citation:**

- **Decision Number:** 1
- **Date Issued:** March 8, 1996
- **Published:** Official Gazette Issue 26, June 27, 1996, Pages 1400-1401
- **Issued by:** Board of Directors, National Higher Conservatory of Music

### **Critical Provision:**

**Article 7:** Establishes doctoral equivalence to Category I status:

*“Holders of doctoral degrees in music or equivalent qualifications shall be classified as Category I civil servants, with all attendant rights, benefits, and compensation structures identical to Category I professors at the Lebanese University.”*

This decision explicitly establishes **1:1 equivalence** between Conservatory and Lebanese University professors.

#### **1.4 Decree <sup>2526</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>: The Foreign Professors Framework**

##### **Official Citation:**

- **Decree Number:** 2526
- **Date Issued:** 1995
- **Purpose:** Implementing decree for Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, specifically addressing the hiring of foreign professors

**Content:** Confirms that foreign professors hired under Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> are subject to the same civil service regime as Lebanese professors.

#### **1.5 Decree <sup>1579</sup>/<sub>2009</sub>: The Financial System Implementation**

##### **Official Citation:**

- **Decree Number:** 1579
- **Date Issued:** March 14, 2009
- **Published:** Official Gazette Issue 14, March 26, 2009, Pages 1741-1781
- **Purpose:** Establishes the financial system for the Conservatory in accordance with Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>

**Significance:** This 2009 decree demonstrates that **14 years after Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> was passed, the government was still issuing decrees to operationalize it.** This is evidence of non-implementation.

#### **1.6 Decree <sup>9806</sup>/<sub>2013</sub>: Presidential Confirmation of Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>**

##### **Official Citation:**

- **Decree Number:** 9806
- **Date Issued:** 2013
- **Issued by:** President of the Republic
- **Approved by:** Council of Ministers
- **Reviewed by:** State Council

**Significance:** This presidential decree reorganizes the Board of Directors structure based on Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, confirming that:

1. Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> remains operative
2. The legal framework established in 1995 continues to govern the Conservatory
3. The Board has authority over staff classification and salary scales
4. Teaching staff have a special status within the public institution framework

**The existence of this 2013 decree is itself evidence of non-implementation.** If Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> had been properly implemented in 1995, there would be no need for a 2013 presidential decree to reorganize the Board based on that law.

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# PART II: THE TIMELINE OF IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE

## 2.1 The Critical Timeline

Year	Event	Evidence of Implementation Status
1995	Law <sup>431</sup> / <sub>1995</sub> enacted	Law is passed but implementation begins
1995	Board Decision <sup>2</sup> / <sub>1995</sub> issued	Operationalization decree issued—suggests law not self-executing
1995	Board Decision <sup>1</sup> / <sub>1996</sub> issued	Category I equivalence established
1995	Decree <sup>2526</sup> / <sub>1995</sub> issued	Foreign professors framework—suggests implementation gaps
2009	Decree <sup>1579</sup> / <sub>2009</sub> issued	<b>14 years later, financial system still being operationalized</b>
2010	Board Decision <sup>3</sup> / <sub>2010</sub> issued	<b>15 years later, classification system “shall be implemented starting 2010-2011”</b>
2013	Decree <sup>9806</sup> / <sub>2013</sub> issued	<b>18 years later, presidential decree still reorganizing Board</b>
2015	Ministry of Labor Opinion <sup>1266</sup> / <sub>2015</sub>	Explicitly classifies Tom as Category I civil servant
2015	Blue-Ink Letter	Ministry admits violations of Law <sup>431</sup> / <sub>1995</sub> and calculates \$47.3 million fiscal liability
2015-2025	Non-execution period	<b>10 years of refusal to execute Opinion <sup>1266</sup>/<sub>2015</sub></b>

## 2.2 The 15-Year Gap: Board Decision <sup>3</sup>/<sub>2010</sub>

**Board Decision No. 3 (January 28, 2010)** is the smoking gun of non-implementation.

**Official Citation:**

- **Decision Number:** 3
- **Date Issued:** January 28, 2010
- **Published:** Official Gazette No. 16, April 1, 2010, Pages 2820-2821
- **Issued by:** Board of Directors, National Higher Conservatory of Music
- **Approved by:** Minister of Culture Salim Wardeh

### **The Critical Language:**

*“The reclassification of teaching staff in the Eastern Section shall be implemented starting from the academic year 2010-2011.”*

### **What This Means:**

The Board Decision explicitly references Board Decision <sup>2</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> as the operative framework. Yet it says the classification system “shall be implemented starting from 2010-2011.”

**This is an admission that the 1995 classification system had NOT been implemented for 15 years.**

If the system had been properly implemented in 1995, there would be no need for a 2010 decision to implement it again. The use of “shall be implemented” (future tense) in 2010 for a system that was supposed to be implemented in 1995 is direct evidence of implementation failure.

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## **PART III: THE BLUE-INK LETTER OF 2015 - THE MINISTERIAL CONFESSION**

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### **3.1 The Unprecedented Admission**

In 2015, the Ministry of Labor issued what has become known as the “Blue-Ink Letter”—a formal administrative document signed in blue ink by a ministry official, acknowledging systematic violations of labor law and failure to implement Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>.

### **Official Status:**

- **Issued by:** Ministry of Labor
- **Date:** 2015
- **Significance:** An unprecedented confession by the state itself

### 3.2 What the Blue-Ink Letter Admitted

The letter explicitly acknowledged:

1. **Misclassification of Employment Status:** The Conservatory had violated labor laws by misclassifying employment status.
2. **Failure to Register Social Security:** The Conservatory failed to register social security contributions correctly.
3. **Kafala-Equivalent System:** The Ministry admitted that the kafala-equivalent system (under which residency and work permits had been granted) was **incompatible with the legal framework guaranteeing workers' rights.**
4. **Violation of Law 431/1995:** The Ministry explicitly stated that the Conservatory's practices violated Law 431/1995.
5. **Fiscal Liability:** The Ministry calculated a **fiscal liability of \$47.3 million** relating to:
  - Unpaid social security contributions
  - Unpaid benefits
  - Retroactive entitlements owed to affected employees

### 3.3 The Paradox: Confession Without Remedy

**The Blue-Ink Letter is the most damning evidence of institutional defiance because it proves the state KNEW about the violations and DID NOTHING.**

Despite the letter's explicit admissions:

- **No corrective action was taken**
- **No timeline for compliance was established**
- **No penalties were imposed on the Conservatory**

- **No mechanism for enforcement was created**
- **The NSSF continued to deny benefits**, claiming “missing employer declarations” and “system limitations”
- **The Conservatory maintained a posture of denial or indifference**

### 3.4 The Execution Gap in Action

The Blue-Ink Letter perfectly illustrates the **execution gap**: the gap between formal legal rights and actual enforcement.

**The formula:**  $P = L \times C$

Where:

- **P** = Personhood (actual rights in practice)
- **L** = Legal recognition (rights on paper)
- **C** = Capacity to enforce (ability to compel compliance)

In Tom Hornig’s case:

- **L** = Confirmed by Opinion <sup>1266</sup>/<sub>2015</sub> (Category I civil servant status)
- **C** = Effectively nullified (NSSF refuses to comply, Conservatory ignores directives)
- **P** = Zero (no benefits, no legal recognition in practice)

## PART IV: WHY IMPLEMENTATION FAILED - INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS

### 4.1 The Shadow Regime

Since Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> was passed, the Conservatory has operated under a “**shadow regime**”—a parallel system of employment that exists outside the formal legal framework.

**Characteristics of the Shadow Regime:**

1. **Kafala-Equivalent System:** Foreign professors were hired under a kafala-like system, where their legal status was tied to their employment, making them vulnerable to arbitrary termination and benefit denial.
2. **Residency Permit Misclassification:** Work permits were issued with classifications that denied professional identity. For example, Tom Hornig's 1994 permit bore the label "Work: Wife," erasing his professional identity as Principal Saxophonist.
3. **Social Security Non-Registration:** Despite working as civil servants, foreign professors were not registered with the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), creating a legal fiction of non-employment.
4. **Institutional Gatekeeping:** The NSSF and Conservatory became gatekeepers, serving sectarian patrons rather than enabling rights.

## 4.2 Sectarian Dynamics and the Zero-Sum Reflex

Lebanon's confessional system creates a "zero-sum reflex"—the belief that granting rights to one group diminishes the rights of another. This dynamic prevented implementation of Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>:

1. **Sectarian Competition:** Granting full civil service status to foreign professors (particularly those from Western countries) was seen as threatening to Lebanese employees and sectarian interests.
2. **Institutional Resistance:** The NSSF and Conservatory leadership resisted implementation because it would require:
  - Retroactive payment of benefits
  - Recognition of foreign workers as civil servants
  - Redistribution of institutional resources
3. **Political Will Absent:** Despite the law's clarity, no political will existed to enforce it against entrenched institutional interests.

## 4.3 Bureaucratic Evasion Tactics

The documents reveal systematic bureaucratic evasion:

1. **Delayed Implementation:** Successive decrees (1995, 2009, 2013) were issued to operationalize a law that should have been self-executing, creating endless opportunities for delay.
2. **Missing Documentation:** The NSSF cited “missing employer declarations” and “system limitations” as reasons for non-compliance, despite the Ministry’s letter confirming the violations.
3. **Institutional Denial:** The Conservatory maintained a posture of denial or indifference, ignoring ministerial directives and administrative findings.
4. **Administrative Confession Without Remedy:** The Blue-Ink Letter itself became a tool of evasion—by admitting violations without providing remedies, the state created a false appearance of accountability while maintaining the status quo.

#### 4.4 The Role of Institutional Corruption

The documents suggest that institutional corruption—not mere bureaucratic incompetence—drove non-implementation:

1. **Financial Benefit to Institutions:** By denying benefits, the Conservatory and NSSF saved millions in pension contributions, health insurance, and retroactive payments.
2. **Illicit Enrichment:** The withholding of wages and benefits that were mathematically due constitutes illicit enrichment—the state benefited financially from denying rights.
3. **Concealment:** The shadow regime allowed institutions to conceal violations from public scrutiny and international oversight.

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## PART V: EVIDENCE OF DELIBERATE NON-IMPLEMENTATION

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### 5.1 The Pattern of Successive Decrees

The issuance of multiple decrees (1995, 2009, 2013) to operationalize a single law is evidence of deliberate non-implementation:

- **Decree 2526/1995** (same year as the law) suggests the law was not self-executing
- **Decree 1579/2009** (14 years later) suggests financial system was never operationalized
- **Decree 9806/2013** (18 years later) suggests Board structure was never properly established

Each decree created new opportunities for delay and evasion.

## 5.2 Board Decision 3/2010: The 15-Year Admission

Board Decision 3/2010 is the clearest evidence of deliberate non-implementation:

- It explicitly references Board Decision 2/1995 as the operative framework
- It states the classification system “shall be implemented starting from 2010-2011”
- This is 15 years after the original decision
- The use of future tense (“shall be implemented”) in 2010 for a system from 1995 is an admission of failure

## 5.3 The Blue-Ink Letter: Confession of Systemic Violation

The 2015 Blue-Ink Letter proves the state KNEW about the violations:

- The Ministry explicitly acknowledged misclassification
- The Ministry explicitly acknowledged failure to register social security
- The Ministry calculated a \$47.3 million fiscal liability
- Yet the Ministry took no corrective action

This is not negligence. This is institutional defiance.

## 5.4 The 10-Year Non-Execution (2015-2025)

Opinion 1266/2015 explicitly classified Tom Hornig as a Category I civil servant. Yet 10 years later:

- The NSSF refuses to provide benefits
- The Conservatory refuses to recognize the classification
- No enforcement action has been taken
- No timeline for compliance has been established

This is institutional defiance against the state's own opinion.

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## **PART VI: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS - THE EXECUTION GAP GLOBALLY**

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### **6.1 The Execution Gap as a Global Phenomenon**

The failure to implement Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> is not unique to Lebanon. Research documents similar execution gaps globally:

#### **United States - Labor Law Enforcement:**

- Between 2010-2021, over 50 million Americans were paid less than minimum wage
- Annual wage theft losses: \$155 billion
- Only 1 in 4 repeat offenders receive fines
- 98% of low-wage workers subject to forced arbitration never file claims

#### **Gulf States - Kafala System:**

- Migrant workers are legally tied to employers, rendering them vulnerable to legal invisibility
- Formal protections exist but are systematically unenforced

#### **Southeast Asia - Migrant Labor:**

- Complex bureaucratic stratifications enable selective recognition and exclusion
- Laws exist but are not implemented for vulnerable workers

#### **European Union - Digital Privacy:**

- GDPR requires data protection, but implementation varies widely
- Fines are often insufficient to compel compliance

## 6.2 Lebanon's Distinctive Execution Gap

Lebanon's execution gap is distinctive because:

1. **Confessional System:** Sectarian competition prevents enforcement of universal rights
  2. **Institutional Corruption:** Financial incentives drive non-implementation
  3. **Kafala-Equivalent System:** Foreign workers are rendered legally invisible
  4. **Administrative Confession Without Remedy:** The state admits violations but refuses to enforce remedies
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## PART VII: LEGAL ANALYSIS - WHY LAW <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> IS BINDING AND UNAMBIGUOUS

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### 7.1 Article 3: The Binding Equivalence Clause

Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, Article 3 is unambiguous:

*“The provisions that apply to the Lebanese University shall apply to the National Conservatory in all matters concerning supervisory bodies, administrative governance, and employment of teaching staff.”*

This is not discretionary. The word “shall” indicates a mandatory obligation, not a suggestion.

### 7.2 Board Decision <sup>2</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, Article 17: The Civil Service Mandate

Board Decision <sup>2</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, Article 17 is equally unambiguous:

*“All teaching staff, whether Lebanese or foreign, whether permanent or contracted, shall be subject to the civil service regime.”*

This explicitly includes foreign professors. There is no exception for foreigners.

### 7.3 Board Decision <sup>1</sup>/<sub>1996</sub>, Article 7: The Category I Equivalence

Board Decision <sup>1</sup>/<sub>1996</sub>, Article 7 establishes:

*“Holders of doctoral degrees in music or equivalent qualifications shall be classified as Category I civil servants, with all attendant rights, benefits, and compensation structures identical to Category I professors at the Lebanese University.”*

This is a binding classification, not a discretionary one.

### 7.4 Opinion <sup>1266</sup>/<sub>2015</sub>: The Ministerial Classification

The Ministry of Labor’s Opinion <sup>1266</sup>/<sub>2015</sub> explicitly classified Tom Hornig as a Category I civil servant based on:

- Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>
- Board Decision <sup>2</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>
- His 31 years of service
- His qualifications

This opinion was never challenged. It acquired the force of final judgment (res judicata). It is binding.

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## PART VIII: THE FINANCIAL IMPACT - THE \$47.3 MILLION LIABILITY

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### 8.1 What the Blue-Ink Letter Calculated

The Ministry of Labor’s 2015 letter calculated a fiscal liability of **\$47.3 million** for:

1. **Unpaid Social Security Contributions:** 31 years of contributions that should have been made but were not
2. **Unpaid Benefits:** Pension benefits, health insurance, disability coverage

3. **Retroactive Entitlements:** Salary adjustments, allowances, bonuses owed under civil service law

## 8.2 The Calculation Methodology

Based on Law <sup>6</sup>/<sub>70</sub> (Lebanese University employment law), which applies to Conservatory professors under parity:

- **Teaching Hours:** Tom exceeded Lebanese University standards by 700%
- **65% Allowance:** Mandatory under Law <sup>6</sup>/<sub>70</sub>, Article 11
- **Pension Calculation:** 31 years × average salary × pension formula
- **Health Insurance:** 31 years of family coverage
- **Retroactive Adjustments:** 31 years of salary adjustments not applied

## 8.3 Why This Matters

The \$47.3 million calculation proves:

1. **The law was known:** The Ministry knew about Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> and its requirements
2. **The violations were quantifiable:** The Ministry calculated exact amounts owed
3. **The violations were intentional:** The state benefited financially from non-compliance
4. **The remedy is clear:** The Ministry knew what needed to be paid

Yet nothing was paid. This is institutional defiance.

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# PART IX: THE CURRENT STATUS (2025)

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## 9.1 What Has Been Implemented

- **Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>:** Exists and is cited in official documents
- **Board Decisions <sup>1</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, <sup>2</sup>/<sub>1995</sub>, <sup>1</sup>/<sub>1996</sub>:** Exist and are cited in official documents
- **Opinion <sup>1266</sup>/<sub>2015</sub>:** Exists and explicitly classifies Tom as Category I

- **Decree 9806/2013:** Exists and reorganizes Board based on Law 431/1995

## 9.2 What Has NOT Been Implemented

- **Civil Service Status:** Foreign professors are still not registered as civil servants
- **Social Security Benefits:** The NSSF refuses to provide benefits despite the law
- **Category I Classification:** Despite Opinion 1266/2015, the classification is not recognized in practice
- **Retroactive Payments:** No payments have been made for 31 years of unpaid benefits
- **Health Insurance:** Foreign professors are still denied health coverage

## 9.3 The Ongoing Defiance

As of October 2025:

- The Conservatory reduced Tom Hornig's teaching hours in violation of Law 431/1995
- Pay slips show a 30% cut, justified internally as a "budget adjustment"
- This reduction occurred despite Opinion 1266/2015 and the Blue-Ink Letter
- No enforcement action has been taken against the Conservatory

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# CONCLUSIONS

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## 10.1 The Evidence is Overwhelming

1. **Law 431/1995 is binding and unambiguous:** It mandates parity between Conservatory and Lebanese University
2. **Board Decisions 1/1995, 2/1995, 1/1996 are binding:** They operationalize the law and establish civil service status
3. **Opinion 1266/2015 is binding:** It explicitly classifies Tom as Category I civil servant

4. **The Blue-Ink Letter proves the state knew:** The Ministry admitted violations and calculated liability
5. **Non-implementation is institutional defiance:** The state refuses to execute its own legal obligations

## 10.2 This is Not Administrative Failure

The pattern of behavior—successive decrees, 15-year delays, Blue-Ink Letter without remedy, ongoing non-compliance—demonstrates that this is not mere bureaucratic incompetence. This is **institutional defiance**.

The state:

- Knows the law
- Knows the violations
- Knows the amounts owed
- Refuses to comply

## 10.3 The Execution Gap in Lebanon

Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> demonstrates the execution gap in its starkest form: a law that is clear, binding, and unambiguous, yet systematically unenforced. The gap between **L** (legal recognition) and **C** (capacity to enforce) is absolute.

## 10.4 Recommendations

1. **Immediate Compliance:** The NSSF must register all Conservatory teaching staff as civil servants
  2. **Retroactive Payments:** The state must calculate and pay all retroactive benefits owed since 1995
  3. **Enforcement Mechanism:** A court-appointed monitor must oversee compliance
  4. **Institutional Reform:** The Conservatory and NSSF must be restructured to prevent future violations
  5. **Anti-Corruption Investigation:** The Ministry of Labor and NSSF leadership must be investigated for illicit enrichment
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# APPENDIX: DOCUMENT REFERENCES

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## Primary Legal Instruments

Document	Official Citation	Published	Status
Law <sup>431</sup> / <sub>1995</sub>	Law No. 431, 15/05/1995	OG Issue 21, 25/05/1995, p. 487	<b>BINDING</b>
Board Decision <sup>2</sup> / <sub>1995</sub>	Decision No. 2, 26/08/1995	OG Issue 42, 19/10/1995, pp. 1223-1226	<b>BINDING</b>
Board Decision <sup>1</sup> / <sub>1996</sub>	Decision No. 1, 08/03/1996	OG Issue 26, 27/06/1996, pp. 1400-1401	<b>BINDING</b>
Decree <sup>2526</sup> / <sub>1995</sub>	Decree 2526, 1995	Official Gazette	<b>BINDING</b>
Decree <sup>1579</sup> / <sub>2009</sub>	Decree 1579, 14/03/2009	OG Issue 14, 26/03/2009, pp. 1741-1781	<b>BINDING</b>
Board Decision <sup>3</sup> / <sub>2010</sub>	Decision No. 3, 28/01/2010	OG No. 16, 01/04/2010, pp. 2820-2821	<b>BINDING</b>
Decree <sup>9806</sup> / <sub>2013</sub>	Decree 9806, 2013	Official Gazette	<b>BINDING</b>
Opinion <sup>1266</sup> / <sub>2015</sub>	Ministry of Labor Opinion <sup>1266</sup> / <sub>2015</sub>	2015	<b>FINAL &amp; BINDING</b>
Blue-Ink Letter	Ministry of Labor, 2015	2015	<b>ADMISSION OF VIOLATIONS</b>

## Supporting Documents

- Law <sup>6</sup>/<sub>70</sub> (Lebanese University Employment Law)
  - Decree <sup>112</sup>/<sub>1959</sub> (Lebanese Civil Service Law)
  - Social Security Law <sup>13955</sup>/<sub>1963</sub>
  - Law <sup>28</sup>/<sub>2017</sub> (Access to Information)
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**This report demonstrates that Law <sup>431</sup>/<sub>1995</sub> has never been properly implemented, and that the state's own admission of violations (the Blue-Ink Letter) combined with 10 years of non-compliance constitutes institutional defiance against its own legal obligations.**